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TAX ASPECTS OF MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION
UNDER NORTH DAKOTA LAW

DOUGLAS

A.

CHRISTENSEN*

I. INTRODUCTION
Before the dissolution of most marriages of some duration the
parties will have acquired property and raised children. Upon the
dissolution of the marriage there must be a division of the property,
provisions made for the custody and support of the children, and a
determination of the obligations to pay alimony and child support.
In most divorces involving lower or middle income couples,
very little attention is given to the income tax implications of the
division of property and the obligation of support. In divorces
involving wealthy people the tax implications are crucial, and too
often overlooked until too late. All property settlement agreements
involving alimony, child custody and support, and the division of
property should be reviewed to determine the tax implications
before the agreement becomes part of the final divorce decree.
Contested divorce cases in which the division of property, the
-B.A.. Concordia College, Moorhead. Minnesota. 1968: .J.D.. Un,.'ersitv of North Dakota
School of Law. 1971: partner in law firm of Pearson & Christensen (Chartered). Grand Forks, North
Dakota.
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custody of children, the obligation of support, and the amount and
duration of alimony are in question require that the income tax
ramifications of these questions be presented at the trial level. The
North Dakota Supreme Court has specifically noted that it will not
speculate as to the income tax consequences of the lower court's
judgment on appeal, unless the tax effects of the judgment are
presented to the lower court. I Often it is impossible to know the tax
effect of the lower court's decision until it is entered. Once the
judgment is entered, a motion to reconsider may be in order both to
present the income tax effects of the judgment to the lower court,
and to preserve the matter so the tax implications may be
considered by the supreme court on appeal.
As the United States Supreme Court has stated, applicable
state law must be examined to determine the rights, duties, and
obligations of the parties to each other for support and
maintenance.' Thus, when examining the tax implications of the
division of property and the award of alimony in North Dakota, a
general review of North Dakota law governing the award of
property and alimony is in order.
Under North Dakota law the husband has a duty to support
his wife out of his property and his labor. 3 The wife must support
the husband out of her separate property when the husband has not
deserted her, or when he has no separate property and he is unable
from infirmity to support himself. 4 Except for this support
obligation, neither the husband nor the wife have an interest in the
property of the other. 5 In Bellon v. Bellon 6 the North Dakota
Supreme Court stated that section 14-07-04 of the North Dakota
7
Century Code abolished all marital property interests .
In Hagert v. Hagert8 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
section 4077 of the Code of 1905, which is identical to section 1407-03 of the North Dakota Century Code, imposed a duty upon the
husband and wife to support each other and created an inchoate
interest in each parties' property to satisfy that support obligation. 9
Furthermore, the support obligation may be imposed on the other
spouse's. separate property by the court in a decree of divorce or
1. Keig v. Keig, 270 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1978).
2. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 70 (1962).
3. N.D. CENT. CODE 1i4-07-03 (1971).
4. Id.
5. N.D. CENT. CODE $ 14-07-04 (1971).
6. 237 N.W.2d 163 (N.D. 1976).
7. Bellon v. Bellon, 237 N.W.2d 163, 165 (N.D. 1976).
8. 22 N.D. 290, 133 N.W. 1035 (1911). Hagert did not involve an action for divorce. Rather it
involved an action in which the destitute and informed husband was suing the wealthy wife for
support. The court ordered the wife to support the husband. Id. at 302, 133 N.W. at 1040.
9. Hagert v. Hagert, 22 N.D. 290, 301, 133 N.W. 1035, 1040 (1911).
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order for support. Stated differently, the husband and wife each
have a conditional interest in the property of the other to the extent
necessary for their support, but neither spouse has any further
interest in the other spouse's property. This inchoate interest in the
property of the other spouse because of the marital duty of support
continues until the marriage is terminated by a decree of divorce. ' 0
It appears that the provisions of chapter 14-07 of the North
Dakota Century Code are not a part of the divorce laws in North
Dakota. 1 Upon the termination of the marriage by divorce, the
obligation of support imposed by section 14-07-03 of the North
Dakota Century Code is terminated and section 14-05-24 of' the
3
North Dakota Century Code, 12 as expanded by the Ruff-Fisher1
10. See Bingcrt v. Bingcrt, 247 N.W.2d 464 (N.D. 1976) licaun v. licaon, 99 N.W.2d 9(2
(N.I). 1959); Hodous v. Hodtous, 76 N.D. 392, 36 N.W.2d 554 (1949).
In Hodous the court relied oinscctitti 14-07-03 ol'thc Revised Code of North i)akota (idtcliial t
the present section 14-07-03 of' (he North Dakota Century Codet') to> impoSe ;iii ,obligation of
temporary alimony upon the husband (hiring a divorctc action and ilFplivd that
th lv
l\,
support
continued during the divorce action. 76 N.D.at 398, 36 N.W.2d at 55H.
In Beaton, allaction iii which nit divorcc was grantcd, li (outrt ctlntnli( oin he sonle' stcln
of the Revised Code and held that the lower courldid not cr-atc a lialilitv, but it)nac I ntinucd lc
husband's liability under that section because the' mIarriage had not bcen ici inatcdll. N.W.2d ;t
93-94.
In Bin.uert, the court discussed whether di duty io pay alimony is a Coiruinuation of Ili duly to
pay support and noted as follows:
We b+elieve.
]uiiv'ccr, thai te right to supporti tl'one
siitsc v li
t iflicr
during
niarriage is,as dficud by'Ot- statLttS Mid intlilprteid by o r cass, a rightwhich is
cntircly independent of' li'-right of on'
after ilt inarriagc is cndt d. Als, attitln

sliUtc
to aitiiny

to bc paid b

thi ofthr,

lt
itoegrate ic
il.
inl
Iic tlnwr, wv
bclievc, will only IadI confusion.
Ve believe lhati
Itcitild
n it) init'cr n ihli wsit uclalihs law is to I i'i tirili
as
a nctld of,rehafilitating Ihe i;rly disad'all'tigc'd
bIVtit'
I ]ivlccuThis silst
to i'
the basis of thi Utnilrin Miarriagc aid I )iv'uce Act. adol iI in aitliasl flit St;its, illol
including North l)akoi.
247 N.V.2d at 468- 6 (.

11. (Gcncralhy chaF,cr 14-017 of thc Norih Daktkam (cimury Codel <lab'sback I, l);tkotm
Territorial l asiis it wss t's) ttid in tii I)tiit;t (;isi (>ith. if 1877. lii Ke'igt s. Ktig, 27) N ..2d
558 (N.D. 1978), the North Dakota Suprene Court stat(:( that scction 14-07-08 is not part if'our

divorcc lass. Id.at 56(0.
Furlthrtnoct.

in fultti v. fitllht. 237 N.\V.2d 163 (N.I). 1976), liiw c

li

stated that scciilt 14-07-04 is not part ofu diorcctlaw. Id. al 164.
It Ketu4 ic cir fiund that l'xisting las lw'
titil scthim 14-(15-24 gvcrn Iit' irties' right'

in

tfin
dispo~sition of' prope+trty and thi'ir
oblligations (d"supprt
niarriagc. 27(1 N .W.2d l 560
12. Siction 14-05-24 of'Itt. North

to onc ;ulo+lhcr
Fpll~o
a dissolutio>n lf'

)akoita (cnIttry Citidi l5rovidcs
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\Xqhcn a divorce is grantedl, thc coutir
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sui:
h quitabh' distrihllion ol'tlli,
rv'al
and personal property of*Ihift
partis as insi';cl'tit
just and pilper, and tisy (l<I
cihficr
oftfc plarti's ii liirov
ie fr ili' ainictttni t f Ittc iItlil rtci if ti' ititi ag, ittif
Io Itlke sutch suitaflh' ailltw ttic's tio Ilt' iilicr party fur s U polilrt
uiring lif' it ri ;I
sftttricr pcriod as I,) li(t court imas' sccin jnsi. having rcgat d I i li e inri- isltiincs iflllh
hartics rcspecitisily. Th'
tttt
fi-ttt tin
i to tini' iti nioidif's its
tsitilicsc
hri
I ispi is.

N.D.CENI. Co t
14-05-24 (1971).
13. In Ruffv. Ruff, 71 N.I). 775, 52 N.W2(f 107 (11152), it court alp vcd thic fillowing ruh's
to ifcterniine Ilhi' abilityof thu parits ti plia
atun
t 10 bi a(tptlicd ini he dctiusion Ofprpertlv
In determining tftu' question ofahtonr ii
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guidelines, governs the trial court in making an equitable division
of the property and awarding alimony and child support. The obligation to provide support and alimony imposed under section 1405-24 ends upon the death of the person receiving the alimony, the
death of the person providing the support, or the happening of a
contingency. 14
During the marriage neither spouse has the right to claim part
of the other spouse's estate since each spouse must survive the other
in order to receive a share in the deceased spouse's estate. This is
true whether the deceased spouse dies testate or intestate. 5 As the
6
common-law concepts of dower and courtesy have been abolished,1
neither spouse has rights which are subject to the laws of descent
and distribution.
Having briefly analyzed a spouse's right in the property of the
other because of marriage, this article will focus on the three most
common problems which arise in every divorce involving property
and children. These problems are the division of property, the
award of alimony, and the obligation to provide child support by
the custodial and noncustodial parent.

II. PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
A.

TRANSFERS OF APPRECIATED PROPERTY

The landmark case and the precedent established by that case
which should be addressed in every divorce involving a division of
property owned by one or both parties is United States v. Davis. '7 In
to the marriage: their earning ability: the duration of and the conduct of each during
the marriage: their station in life: the circumstances and necessities of each; their
health and physical condition: their financial circumstances as shown by the property
owned at the time, its value at the time. its income-producing capacity, if any, and
Whether accumulated or acquired before or qfter the marriage; and from all such elements the
court should determine the rights of the parties and all other matters pertaining to the
case.

Id. at 784.52 N.W.2d at 111, (quoting Holmes v. Holmes, 152 Neb. 556. 556, 41 N.W.2d 919, 920
(1950) (emphasis added)).
In Fischer %'.Fischer. 139 N.W.2d 845 (N.D. 1966), the court expanded the above rules to
include "such other matters as may be material.'" Id. at 847, in sylabus 7.
14. See supra note 12 for text of statute. In Haugeberg v. Haugeberg, 258 N.W.2d 657 (N.D.
1977), the court stated. "[tfhe award of periodic alimony, as opposed to a lump sum alimony,
permits either part' to seek a modification of the judgment respecting alimony if conditions change."
Id. at 665.
The dissent in Hasgeberg stated tle following: "Alimony (unless specifically ordered otherwise)
ends when either party dies or the wife remarries. Id. at 668 (\'ogel.,I.. dissenting).
15. N.D. C ENT. CODE § 30.1-04-04 (1973).
16. N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-07-09 (1971): N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-13 (1973).
17. 370 U.S. 65(1962).
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1954 Mr. Davis and his wife were divorced under the existing laws
of Delaware. Pursuant to the divorce decree Mr. Davis transferred
to his wife 1,000 shares of stock in E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
which he held solely in his name. Under the existing Delaware law,
Mrs. Davis had certain statutory marital rights, including the right
of dower, the right to inherit if she survived her husband, and the
right upon divorce to receive alimony and part of her husband's
property. Mrs. Davis accepted her husband's DuPont stock in full
settlement and satisfaction of any and all claims and rights against
her husband.
The Internal Revenue Service determined that a "taxable
event" occurred when Mr. Davis transferred his shares of DuPont
stock to Mrs. Davis in satisfaction of her statutory marital rights.
The Service ruled that Mr. Davis had realized a long-term capital
gain of $7,474.63, which was the difference between Mr. Davis'
basis in the DuPont stock and its fair market value at the time of
transfer. Mr. Davis argued that the transfer of the stock to his wife
was comparable to a "non-taxable" division of property between
co-owners.
In rejecting his argument and upholding the Service, the
Court held as follows:
The taxpayer's analogy, however, stumbles on its own
premise, for the inchoate rights granted a wife in her
husband's property by the Delaware law do not even
remotely reach the dignity of co-ownership. The wife has
no interest - passive or active - over the management
or disposition of her husband's personal property. Her
rights are not descendable, and she must survive him to
share in his intestate estate. Upon dissolution of the
marriage she shares in the property only to such extent as
the court deems "reasonable."
.
.
. What
is
"reasonable" might be ascertained independent of the
extent of the husband's property by such criteria as the
wife's financial condition, her needs in relation to her
accustomed station in life, her age and health, the
number of children and their ages, and the earning capacity of the husband ....
Delaware seems only to place a burden on the
husband's property rather than to make the wife a part owner
thereof. In the present context the rights of succession and
reasonable share do not differ significantly from the

168
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husband's obligations of support and alimony. They all
partake more of a personal liability to the husband than a property
interest of the wife. The effectuation of these marital rights
may ultimately result in the ownership of some of the husband's property as it did here, but certainly this
happenstance does not equate the transaction with a
division of property by co-owners. 18
The Court went on to find that Mr. Davis received something
of value when his wife waived her inchoate marital rights and right
to receive alimony in exchange for the 1,000 shares of stock, and
that the value of her marital rights was equal to the fair market
value of the stock transferred. 19 Therefore, the transfer of his stock
to her for a release of her inchoate marital rights gave rise to a
taxable event.
It is the writer's opinion that Davis applies to all transfers of
appreciated property by one spouse to the other pursuant to a
property settlement or a decree of divorce under North Dakota law.
The previous review of North Dakota law as it relates to the
property rights of a husband and a wife establishes that neither
party has any marital property rights. 20 Further, whatever interest
each may have in the property of the other is at best an "inchoate
interest" which arises only when an action for support or divorce
commences. 21 Furthermore, neither spouse has an active or passive
interest in the management or disposition of the other spouse's
personal or real property during the marriage. 2 2 North Dakota has
abolished the common-law concepts of dower and curtesy, 23 and
each spouse must survive the other in order to share in the testate or
intestate distribution of his or her mate. Upon the dissolution of the
marriage, the division of property and award of alimony are based
upon what is reasonable in light of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines.
Thus, it appears that Davis applies to transfers of appreciated
property made pursuant to a divorce under North Dakota law.
Although no reported federal cases have applied Davis to
North Dakota law, in Wallace v. United States, 24 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals applied Davis when it reviewed a division of
property pursuant to a divorce granted under Iowa law which is
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. tt 70 (emphasis added).
Id at72.
Ser.stpra notes 5, 6. 7 and text referenced thereto for a discussion of North Dakota law.
Seestupra notes 8 and 9 and text referenced thereto.
Se sttpra notes 6 and 7 and text referenced thereto.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-09 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-13 (1976).
439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971) aff'g 309 F. Sut . 748 (S.D. Iowa 1970).
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similar to North Dakota's law. In Wallace the husband transferred
appreciated stock held in his name to his wife and in exchange for
the stock she waived her right to receive additional property and
her right to receive alimony. Mr. Wallace argued, as Mr. Davis
did, that the transfer of property incident to the divorce constituted
a division of property between "equitable co-owners" rather than a
transfer of his property in exchange for the release of his marital
obligations.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the district
court, which had found the transfer of the appreciated stock a
taxable event, reviewed the law of Iowa and found that it, like the
law of Delaware, granted the wife no interest, either active or
passive, in her husband's personal or real property prior to the
entry of the divorce decree. 2 5 Furthermore, the rights of a wife in
that she only
Iowa closely paralleled those of a wife in Delaware in
26
possessed inchoate rights in her husband's property.
Lest the reader feel that the Tax Court may be a better forum
for a client who has transferred substantially appreciated property
to a spouse in return for a relinquishment of the spouse's rights to
further property or alimony, the reader should be aware of the case
entitled Richard E. Wiles, jr.27 Mr. Wiles transferred substantially
appreciated stock to his wife pursuant to a property settlement
agreement which provided that she received the stock in satisfaction
of his support obligation and her right to present or future alimony.
The Tax Court reviewed Kansas law and held that Davis applied to
the transfer made pursuant to a divorce and which involved
28
substantially appreciated property owned by the husband.
25. WtIlacv. United Slaws, 43) F.2d 757. 7608th Cir. 1971).
26. 1In I Vallara the transft iii

stock from the husb~and was made pursua nt to Iowa CoItde section

598 14 whic Ii provided iiat "Iw hin i divtrce is (lCCreed, the court mav make stiChforder in relation
to IIe child ren, property, parties and the maintenanee oi'the parties is shall be right.
"Subse(IuCnt

cianiges- ttay he itnade by it ill

lhese respecis When circumstances render tiem

expedient.- IOWA CoDE § 598.14 (1950). 439 F.2d at 760.
27. 60 T.C. 56(197:3).
28. Richard E. Wiles, Jr., 60 T.C. 56, 61-62 (1973). In Wiles, the Tax Court reviewed Kansas
Statutes Annotated section 60-1610(b) which provides as fbllows:
Diz,iiion q1' Propor. The decree shall divide the real .,nd personal property of the
parties, whether owned by either spouse prior to marriage, acquired by either spouse
in his or her own right after marriage, or acquired by their joint efforts, in a just and
reasonable manner, either by a division of the property in kind, or by setting the sait
or ti part thereof over to one of the spouses and requiring either to pay such sum is
may be just and proper, or by ordering a sale of the same under such conditions as the
court may prescribe and dividing the proceeds of such sale.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b), (currently codified as KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(c)(Supp. 1979)).
The Tax Court in commenting on this section noted the following:
The statute itself clearly shows that whatever the nature ofta spotse's interest in the
marital property during the marriage, the salue and extent i" fthat interest cannot be
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In light of Davis, Wallace, Wiles, and present North Dakota
law, in the event there is a transfer of substantially appreciated
property from one spouse to the other, pursuant to a property
settlement or divorce decree in which the wife relinquishes all of her
rights to any further award of property or alimony, that transfer
would be a taxable event which would result in the realization and
recognition of gain to the husband equal to the fair market value of
the property transferred. The taxable gain recognized would be the
fair market value of the property transferred at the date of the
transfer less the actual or adjusted basis.
B.

TRANSFERS

OF

PROPERTY

PROPERTY DEEMED TO BE A
OWNERS"

OR "EQUITABLE

DIVISION

INVOLVING

A

DIVISION

OF

OF PROPERTY HELD AS "CO-

CO-OWNERS"

A problem frequently faced by practitioners negotiating
property settlements or by courts making divisions of property is
the disposition of property acquired and maintained during the
marriage through the joint earnings and efforts of the parties.
Collins v. Commissioner2 9 involved the tax implications of a
partial transfer of the husband's stock to his wife in settlement of all
her property rights, including the right to receive alimony. The
husband was the major stockholder of a corporation which had
prospered greatly during the marriage. The United States Tax
Court originally found that the transfer constituted a disposition of
stock which gave rise to a taxable gain.3 0
After the Tax Court decision and prior to remand by the
United States Supreme Court, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held
that, under applicable Oklahoma law and for Oklahoma income
tax purposes, the husband's transfer of stock to his wife was not a
taxable event.31 The transferred stock had substantially appreciated
ascertained until the marriage is terminated. For all we know, the determination of
what is in the terms of the statute a just and reasonable division of property may
depend on criteria such as the wife's age and health, her independent wealth and
livingstyle at the time ofdivorce. NotwithstandingSec. 60-1610(b), it is still thelawin
Kansas that a wife must survive her partner in order to share in his intestatestate ....
Absent a Kansas decision flatly stating that a property settlement in Kansas is
a division of property between co-owners, we are unwilling to so hold today.
60 T.C. at 61-62 (emphasis in original).
The foregoing considerations are the very same as those which lead the United States Supreme
Court in Davis to a conclusion adverse to the taxpayer.
29. 46 T.C. 461 (1966), qff'd, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968), vacated, 393 U.S. 215, rev'd, 412
F.2d211 (10th Cir. 1969).
30. Collins v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 461 (1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968).
31. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290, 297 (Okla.1968) (emphasis added). The
Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed Oklahoma law and found that property acquired jointly during
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in value during the marriage. Part of the appreciation was due to
the wife's substantial contributions to the well-being of the
corporation. These contributions were recognized by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court when it noted that the efforts of the wife
during the marriage contributed substantially to the value of the
stock, which gave her a "species of common ownership" or a
"vested interest" in the stock even though the stock was held solely
32
in the name of her husband.
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the Oklahoma Supreme Court
decision and held that the transfer of stock fromthe husband to his
wife pursuant to the divorce decree operated "merely to finalize the
extent of the wife's vested interest in the property she and her
husband held under a 'species of common ownership.' ,,33
Therefore, the transfer was not a taxable event, rather it was a
division of property held under a "species of common ownership."
In Imel v. United States34 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed the tax implications of a property settlement in which the
husband transferred substantially appreciated stock to his wife in
return for a relinquishment of all of her marital property rights,
and her right to receive alimony. The Colorado law in question was
similar to the Oklahoma law reviewed in Collins. In Imel the federal
district court had certified three questions of law to the Supreme
Court of Colorado for review 35 before it ruled on the taxable effect
the marriage or which appreciated during the marriage was property in which there was a species ot
common ownership. Id. The Oklahoma statute provided as follows:
As to such property, whether real or personal, as shall have been acquired by the
partiesJointly during their marriage, whether the title thereto be in either or both of saidparties, the
court shall make such division between the parties respectively as may appear just and
reasonable, by a division of the property in kind, or by setting the same apart toone of
the parties, and requiring the other thereof to pay such sum as may be just and proper
to effect a fair and just division thereof.
OKLA. STAT. (it. 12, S 1278 (1979) (emphasis added).
32. 446 P.2d at 295.
33. Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211, 212 (10th Cir. 1969).
34. 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975).
35. In Re Questions Submitted by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
184 Colo. 1,517 P.2d 1331 (1974). The questions are as follows:
When tinder 1963 C.R.S. 46-1-5 [or under 1963 C.R.S. 46-I-13 as amended in 19711
(a) a property settlement agreement is entered into providing for a transfer of property
fron husband to wife in acknowledgement of the wife's contribution to the
aCCutno lation of the marital estate, or.
(b) a decree of the divorce court requires such transfer because of the wife's
contributions to thie accu musulation ofthe famnilv estate, and,
(c) tie transfer is not made in satisfaction of the husband's obligation or support. is
the transfer a taxable event torpurposes of federal income taxation?
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of the husband's transfer. In answering the certified questions, the
Supreme Court of Colorado held, in light of the facts presented,
that the husband's transfer involved the transfer of property in
which there existed a "species of common ownership," and, as
such, the transfer resembled a division of property between coowners. 36 As a result of this interpretation of Colorado law, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that there was no taxable
event when the husband transferred the stock to his wife. 3 7
Both Collins and Imel dealt with the transfer of property held
solely in the husband's name that had substantially appreciated in
value during the marriage, and to which the wife had contributed either to the increase in value or to the acquisition and appreciation of the marital estate as a whole. Further, both cases were
decided after the Supreme Courts of Colorado and Oklahoma had
held that the transfer was in recognition of a "species of common
ownership" which the wife had in the marital estate because of her
contributions to the appreciation in value of the property
transferred or to the marital estate as a whole, and that a division of
this property resembled a division of property between co-owners.
Furthermore, in both cases the transfer was after the parties to the
court-approved settlement agreement had recognized that the wift.
had "aided materially" in the accumulation of the family wealth;
that the agreement was a "fair recognition" of the wife's
participation in the accumulation of the family wealth; and that the
property settlement made a "fair division" of the property so
acquired.
The question then arises whether North Dakota law and the
holdings of Collins and Imel can be applied to circumvent Davis in
similar factual situations.
3 8 the
In Haugeberg v. Haugeberg
North Dakota Supreme Court
had occasion to review a property settlement that resulted from a
dissolution of a marriage in which all of the parties' property was
accumulated during the course of the marriage. At the time of their
marriage, the parties were essentially without funds. During the
P'araphirasing the langua;ge of'Olltrolliig(cas,'s,
Ihc' sain' (pacslion lll~ay
hc"slalcd:
Under the C;olorado law, is suichattransfe'r a rccognition of' a "spa'tics
of c-oninon
ownership" ol the marital estate Ib (he wifi rescinblinga ,ii'ision, o popcril bc1wccn
co-owners, or (foes th iransfr more ilhjsclv
resemble a clinvevani€ by iw hiisbandilor

the release ofan independent obligation owed by him to the w.il'e?
Id.at 3,
36.
37.
38.

517 P.2d at 1331-32.
Id.at 9,5171 .2d at 1335.
1[ree
v. United States, 523 F.2d 853, 857 (10th Cir. 1975).
258 N.W.2d 657 (N.l). 1977).
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course of their marriage neither party received any personal or real
property by gift or inheritance.
In reviewing the division of property the supreme court
reversed the lower court 39 and rejected the opportunity to hold that
property acquired during the course of the marriage from the joint
earnings and efforts of the parties should be divided equally. Rather, the court applied the Ruff-Fisher guidelines to make an
equitable division of the property and remanded the case to the
lower court for further disposition in light of its decision.
Although the issue was not before the court in Haugeberg, it
appears that the North Dakota Supreme Court does not feel that
property acquired during the course of the marriage from the joint
earnings and effort of the parties should necessarily be divided
equally. In Hultberg v. Hultberg,40 the supreme court reversed a
district court which had held that "[tihe property placed in joint
tenancy becomes the property of those persons named in joint
tenancy in equal shares regardless of contribution towards
acquisition and maintenance of such joint tenancy property, and
this rule is applied in determining interest ownership of the joint
tenancy property herein.... ",41 The supreme court stated that the
lower court "must make an equitable division of the property, but
this does not necessarily require an equal division of the property,
whether jointly held or otherwise. "42 In Hultberg the supreme court
rejected the opportunity to hold that property acquired during the
course of the marriage which is jointly owned or held as joint
tenants must be divided equally and chose to rely on the Ruff-Fisher
guidelines to equitably distribute the property.
There presently is little or no authority in North Dakota to
sustain the propositions advanced in Imel that the filing of an action
for divorce vests in the wife an interest in property acquired during
the course of the marriage even though the property is in the
husband's name; or that a transfer of some or all of the property
from the husband to the wife in acknowledgement of the wife's
contributions to the accumulation of the marital estate is made not
in satisfaction of the husband's obligation of support, but rather in
recognition of a "species of common ownership" each spouse has
in the marital estate; or that such a transfer is a division of property
between co-owners. The only support for such a proposition is
found in the dissent in Haugeberg which states that when "making
39.
40.
41.
42.

Haugeberg v. Haugeberg. 258 N.W.2d 657, 662 (N.D. 1977).
259 N.W.2d 41 (N.D. 1977).
Hulberg v. Hulhberg. 259 N.W.2d 41.44 (N.D. 1977).
Id.
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[the North Dakota Supreme Court] should
consider property matters in divorce cases as we would consider
property matters in dissolving a partnership. "41
If it can be shown that during the course of the marriage the
wife contributed to the accumulation of property and income, the
court may be inclined toward an equal distribution of the property
44
although it-is separately owned by the husband.
In light of Haugeberg, Haberstroh, Hultberg, and despite the
strong dissent in these cases and others imploring the court to adopt
the concept of an equal division of the marital property whether
acquired before or during the marriage, it appears that the present
North Dakota Supreme Court may be unwilling to embrace the
"common or equitable ownership" concept, that property
acquired by the parties during the marriage, or property acquired
before the marriage which has substantially appreciated in value
during the marriage because of the joint efforts and contributions of
the parties, although held solely in the name of one of the parties,
should be divided equally.
In summary, under present North Dakota law, Davis will
apply where the husband transfers appreciated property, pursuant
to a property settlement or court ordered property division, to his
wife in return for a full relinquishment of his obligation to provide
support and of her right to receive present or future alimony. Davis
will also apply where there is a transfer of property held in the
husband's name in addition to an award of alimony. In light of the
application of Davis in Wallace and Wiles under laws that appear to
be similar to North Dakota's, this writer has little reason to believe
that the Federal District Court for North Dakota, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals or the United States Tax Court would
rule differently. This is because there is no North Dakota Supreme
Court decision applying the "equitable co-owners" theory to
property which was acquired prior to or during the marriage, held
in the name of one partner only, and which has appreciated in
value due to the joint earnings and contributions of the partners
during the marriage.
property divisions...

C.

TRANSFERS OF JOINTLY-HELD PROPERTY

Under present law the division of property held in joint43. 258 N .W.2d ai667 (Vogel.j... dissenting).
44. See Haberstroh v. Halersir(oh. 258 N.W.2d 669,673 (N.D. 1977). The court inaflirming an
ulqua l division of firtin property to it" husbtand stated

hiat tle wife had left the farll and that sin ce
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tenancy is somewhat ambiguous. In the event that there is an equal
division of joint-tenancy property there will be no adverse tax
consequences to either party. In Revenue Ruling 56-437 the
Internal Revenue Service stated the following:
The conversion, for the purposes of eliminating a
survivorship feature, of a joint tenancy in capital stock of
a corporation into a tenancy in common is a nontaxable
transaction for Federal income tax purposes. Likewise,
the severance of a joint tenancy in stock of a corporation,
under a partition action instituted under. . . [Colorado
law] compelling partition and the issuance of two separate
stock certificates in the names of each of the joint tenants,
45
is a nontaxable transaction.
Additionally, in light of Davis, the equal division of property held as
co-owners, such as property held as tenants in common, results in
no adverse tax consequences.
The practitioner, however, must confront the implications of
the Service's position dealing with the unequal division of joint
tenancy property on divorce. In Revenue Ruling 74-347 the
Service reviewed the division of property on divorce in a state
where the principles of Davis applied. The Service stated the
following:
A husband and wife were married in 1953 when each
had approximately $600 in assets. Neither received an
inheritance or gift of any significance during the
marriage. Both husband and wife were employed
throughout the marriage and their earnings were
commingled so that is was impossible to determine whose
earnings were used to purchase any given asset.
In 1973, the wife was granted a divorce. The total
assets owned by the husband and wife had a net fair
market value of $110,000 at the time of the divorce. The
jointly-owned property, that is, the property either
purchased with earnings of both the husband and the wife
or received by means of a completed gift, consisted of
several assets having a combined net fair market value of
$70,000. The husband's separately owned property had a
she had lefi she had not contributed to any property or income accumflation fo r a dhrtt-year period

prior to the divorce. Id.
45. Rev. Rul. 56-437. 1956-2 C.B. 507.
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net fair market value of $40,000. The wife owned no
property in her own capacity.
The divorce decree awarded the wife jointly-owned
property with a net fair market value of $55,000. The
husband was awarded the remaining jointly-owned
property which had a net fair market value of $15,000
and all of his separately-owned property with a net fair
market value of $40,000. The adjusted basis of all jointlyowned property received by the wife was $29,500, but
$4,000 of such adjusted basis was attributable to personal
furniture with a net fair market value of $2,000.
In addition to the property settlement, the divorce
the wife alimony and support for the
decree also granted
46
minor children.
The Commissioner relied on Davis and ruled that,
since the wife's interest in her husband's separatelyowned property was not the equivalent of co-ownership,
the unequal division ofjointly-owned property awarded the
wife constitutes a taxable exchange of a portion of the husband's
marital rights in the
jointly-owned property for the wife's
47
property.
separately-owned
husband's
Furthermore, the husband realized a gain of $20,000 determined as
follows:
Fair market value of jointly-owned property
received by the wife
One-half [fair market value] share of
jointly-owned property ( /2 of $70,000)
Excess of jointly-owned property received by wife [gain to husband]4 8

$55,000
35,000
$20,000

In Revenue Ruling 74-347 all of the joint tenancy property
held by the parties was lumped together. There was no breakdown
of the property to determine if any piece of property's basis was in
excess of the fair market value so that a normal sale of that piece of
property would have resulted in a loss rather than a gain. The Tax
46. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26-27.
47. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 27.
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Court, in Worthy W. McKinney v. Commissioner,49 commented on the
application of Revenue Ruling 74-347 and noted the following:
[In a divorce,] [n]either party can...

have a net gain or

loss by reason of the overall transaction settling their
rights arising out of the marriage contract. Each party
will, however, have a gain or loss as to specific items of
property (as distinguished from inchoate rights)
transferred pursuant to the divorce at a value which
exceeds or is less than the cost basis of that item of
property in the hands of the person transferring it....

50

The Tax Court noted that although the husband may realize a gain
on the transfer to his wife of some property owned separately by
him, he may recognize losses on items trahsferred which they
owned jointly or on other items owned separately. Thegain or loss
must be figured on an item-by-item basis to determine the net gain
or loss to the transferring spouse.
In light of Revenue Ruling 74-347 and McKinney, it appears
that if there is an unequal division of joint tenancy property so that
the husband retains his separate property and receives a lesser
share of the joint tenancy property, he will realize a gain equal to
the excess fair market value of the property received by the wife,
reduced by one-half of the fair market value of the jointly held
property. This gain may be reduced by losses he may have incurred
in the transfer of other property with a basis exceeding the fair
market value.
The question left unanswered is whether there is a realized
gain when there is an unequal division of joint tenancy property if
the wife received more than one-half of the jointly held property
and the husband retained no separate property of his own. It is the
writer's opinion that the husband would still realize a gain because
of the presumption created in Davis that the value of the wife's
marital rights is equal to the fair market value of the property
received in the divorce. 5 1 Therefore, if she received more than half
of the joint tenancy property she, in effect, would have released her
marital rights in exchange for the excess joint tenancy property.
D.

PROBLEMS

WITH AND

POSSIBLE

SOLUTIONS

TO THE TAX

IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ON DIVORCE
49. 64 T.C. 263 (1975).
50. Worthy W. McKinney v. Commissioner. 64 T.C. 263. 268 (1975).
51. 370 U.S. at 72.
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One solution if the husband owns property separately is to
place all of the husband's separately-held property into joint
tenancy prior to the filing of the divorce action or during the
divorce, and then divide the property equally, or to place that
amount necessary to effect the proposed property settlement into
joint tenancy and then divide it equally. 52 Pursuant to the property
settlement or divorce decree, if the 'joint tenancy property were
divided equally it would appear that there would be no adverse
income tax consequences. It should be noted, however, that the
timeliness of the creation of the .joint tenancy might be challenged
by the Service as a sham to avoid the implications of Davis. The
advisability of such a transfer in light of the possibility of the death
of one of the parties during the proceedings must also be
recognized.
The classic settlement in which the wife is awarded the house
that is normally owned in joint tenancy, all of the furniture, and the
newer automobile will usually generate adverse tax consequences to
the husband. This is especially true when the fair market value of
the house exceeds the basis for the husband's transfer of his onehalf of the house. Because the furniture and car may have a fair
market value less than their basis, in light of McKinney, it is
essential that there be a valuation of the furniture and car to reflect
the fact that their fair market value is less than their basis. This will
generate losses which the husband can use to offset the potential
gain on the transfer of his interest in the house.
Another common practice which can give rise to adverse tax
consequences occurs when the home is sold either during or after
the divorce, and an agreement giving the wife a greater share of the
sales proceeds is made. Normally if the parties' residence is sold
while they are still married, the gain realized upon the sale will not
be taxable if the sale proceeds are invested in another home of
equal or greater value.5 3 If, however, the husband vacates the home
prior to the divorce or is ordered to leave the home so that the home
is no longer his principal residence when it is sold, the husband may
have lost his right to claim the home as his principal residence.
52. The creation of Joint tenanc y interest will result in no gift tax consequences. ,re I.R.C. §
2515. In Davis, however, the Soupre toe Court implied iha it would reject the concept ol'the gifting of'
substantially appreciated property from one spouse to the other and having an equitable dist ribut ion
of the same (luring or prior to a divorce. The Court notel tat it would not be tl ered hv the
l)ritvisions otthe state and gift tax law regarding the transfer oflirolerty froin one spouse to the
i (ther
dluring divorce pro:cedings or settlement negotiations. Rather the Cnurt would look it) the true
nature ofthe transaction. 370 U.S. at 69. See infra note 130.
53. I.R.C. § 1034.
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Furthernore, he may be subject to the realization and recognition
54
of his share of the gain derived from the sale of the home.
For example, assume the parties agree to an unequal
distribution of the proceeds of the sale of a home which was jointly
held. The distribution gives the wife 75 percent of the proceeds and
the husband 25 percent of the proceeds. Further assume that before
the home is sold and prior to the divorce or during the course of the
divorce proceedings, the husband vacates the home or is ordered to
leave the home and, as a result, he establishes a new residence.
Further assume that the home in question has a basis of $25,000
and is sold for the sum of $75,000, which results in a gain of
$50,000. In this situation if the wife were to receive 75 percent of
the proceeds and the husband were to receive 25 percent of the
proceeds, the wife would have a gain of $37,500 and the husband
would have a gain of $12,500. If the husband has lost his right to
claim the home as his principal place of residence, the $12,500 gain
could not be deferred under section 1034 of the Internal Revenue
Code in the event that he reinvested the money in a new home. In
addition, because of the unequal distribution of the proceeds
derived from the sale of the joint tenancy property, the husband
may have a potential gain of $12,500 because his wife received a
greater share of the proceeds as part of the property settlement.
As long as the wife remains in the home or is eligible to claim
the home as her principal place of residence, any gain derived from
the sale of the home or any proceeds derived as a result of an
unequal distribution of the proceeds will not result in a taxable gain
to her under section 1034. But the gain or derived proceeds must be
invested within eighteen months in a new home that has a value
equal to or greater than her basis in the old home.
E. OTHER TAX CONSIDERATIONS IN THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY

The general principles which apply to the taxation of gains or
losses on transfers of property also apply to a Davis-type
transaction, or to a disproportionate transfer of joint tenancy
interests, or to interests held as tenants in common. If a taxpayer
transfers a capital asset as defined under section 1221 of the
Internal Revenue Code, the tax imposed will be at capital gain
rates. 55 Additionally, if a taxpayer transfers an asset used in his
trade or business or held for the production of income or for
54. Treas. Reg. 1.1034-1(c)(3)(i), 25 Fed. Reg. 11910(1960).
55. I.R.C. § 1221.
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investment purposes, section 1231 permits capital gain treatment
56
on all gains and treats all losses as ordinary losses.
Where it appears that the husband will have to make a lump
sum transfer of either appreciated real property or appreciated
personal property, or both, to his wife as a result of the divorce, the
transfer should be made after the divorce decree because section
1239 provides that any gain in a transfer between a husband and
wife will be taxed at ordinary rates and no losses will be recognized
on these transfers. 57 Therefore, if the transfer is made prior to the
final decree of divorce, all gain which normally would be capital
gain under Davis will be treated as ordinary income and subject to
the full ordinary income tax rates. Further, any losses (whether
ordinary or capital) which the taxpayer could have recognized
because the fair market value of the property transferred was less
than its basis will not be allowed.
Section 267 of the Code provides that any losses in a
transaction between the husband and wife are prohibited. 58 The
Tax Court, however, has rejected the Service's contention that to
qualify as an ordinary loss under the Code, 59 the sale must be
contemplated for profit rather than for personal reasons such as a
divorce. 60 Therefore, the losses realized by the husband when he
transfers property to his wife which has a basis that exceeds the fair
market value will be recognized and deducted as ordinary losses if
he held the property for less than one year. The losses will be capital losses if he held the property for more than one year, and if the
sale of the transferred asset would have provided a deductible loss
had there been no divorce.

6

1

It may be possible to structure a loss in favor of the husband in
situations that normally would be taxed as either a capital gain or
ordinary income. This can be done by valuing the asset at an
amount less than its basis and, after the divorce, conveying the
asset to the wife in satisfaction of the husband's obligation imposed
under the divorce decree, in other words, in full satisfaction of her
property rights. The husband will receive either a capital loss or
ordinary loss, and the wife will receive the property at the agreed
fair market value with no adverse tax consequences. This technique
might be applied if the husband holds certain common stocks in
which he has a high basis, but the fair market value is down and the
56. I.R.C. , 1231.

,57. I.R.C.
58.
59.
60.
61.

1239.

1.R.C. 267.
I.R.C. 165(c).
SaWilliam E. Robertson, 55 T.C. 862. 865-66(1971).
Id. Seealso HuhIbergv. Hultberg. 259 N.W.2d 41 (N.D. 1977).
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dividend yield is good. Another such possibility arises when the
husband owns short term bonds or treasury bills nearing maturity.
If the wife is agreeable, the husband could use this method and
generate a loss to offset against potential gain inherent in other
provisions of the property settlement or divorce decree.
If' the property transferred by the husband is appreciated,
tangible, personal property which has been depreciated, the
recapture provisions of section 124562 apply. These provisions tax
gain realized as ordinary income to the extent of depreciation taken
up to the asset's original basis. In addition, the recapture
provisions of section 125063 govern the taxability of gain realized on
the transfer of real property which has a fair market value in excess
of its basis. The gain realized is treated as ordinary income equal to
the difference between the depreciation allowed under the straight
line method of depreciation and the excess depreciation taken
under an accelerated method of depreciation.
If the husband transfers an item of tangible, personal property
which has been used in his trade or business and he has taken
investment credit on that property, section 4764 imposes a recapture
of some or all of'the investment credit depending upon the period of
time the husband has held the asset.
In the unlikely event the husband was required to transfer part
or all of his interest in a partnership, the transfer may involve the
imposition of' tax at the ordinary rates upon the value of
appreciated inventory or accounts receivable held by the
partnership.65

If the husband and wife do not come to an agreement on the
fair market value of the assets transferred which have a potential
recapture of depreciation under sections 1245 and 1250, the Service
has the power to impute a fair market value based upon the actual
fair market value of the assets transferred. Thus, if a transfer of
appreciated, tangible, personal property; intangible, personal
property, such as stocks and bonds; or appreciated real estate from
the husband to the spouse in full satisfaction of her marital property
rights is contemplated, it is imperative that the parties set forth in
the separation agreement or recite in the divorce decree the agreed
fair market value of the items to be transferred. Because both
parties will usually be represented by counsel who have been
involved in extensive negotiations during the proceedings, it will be
62. L ...

1245.

63. I.R.C.

1250.

64. .R. C. 47.
65. I.R.C. § 751.
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presumed that the parties are dealing at arms-length in establishing
value. Thus, the agreed value should withstand challenge by the
Service.
Rather than transfer property to the wife directly, the husband
may choose to sell the appreciated property to a third party under
an installment contract and report the income as the installment
payments are made under the contract. The part of the gain
realized may be treated as ordinary income in light of the recapture
provisions of sections 1245 and 1250, and the balance of the gain
would be subject to favorable capital gain treatment. The husband
might then agree to pay an amount as alimony equal to the
installment payments received. Thus, he could recognize the
payments received under the contract and offset them by a
corresponding deduction for the alimony payments. If such a
course is chosen, the husband should not sell the real property and
then assign his rights under the installment contract to the wife.
This will result in an immediate realization and recognition of all
the gain under the installment contract even though the payments
due under the contract run for several years. 66 The husband may
pledge the installment contract as security for his obligation to pay
periodic alimony. If this course is chosen, care must be taken to
insure the actual receipt of the installment payments under the
contract and the actual payment of the periodic alimony. This will
assure the husband of his right to report the income received under
the contract on the installment basis and to deduct alimony
payments.
F.

POSSIBLE AVENUES AROUND DAVIS

The application of Davis can be avoided if the husband makes
a lump sum cash payment to the wife in return for a full relinquishment of her property rights and her present and future right to
receive alimony.6 7 In addition, Davis can be avoided if the husband
agrees to pay a principal sum which can be actuarially determined
over a period of ten years or more, or over a shorter period if the
payments are subject to termination upon the death of either party,
remarriage of the wife, or a substantial change in the economic
68
circumstances of the husband.
Rather than an outright transfer to the wife of appreciated
66. I.R.C. § 453(d) (1). See also Swaim v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969), aff'g 50
T.C. 302 (1968).
67. I.R.C. 5 71(b).
68. I.R.C. 5 71(c)(2).
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property held solely in the husband's name or an unequal division
of jointly-owned property, one possibility, if the property has
appreciated in value, is to borrow against the property or refinance
the property if it is subject to an existing mortgage. The proceeds
derived could be given to the wife in lieu of a lump sum property
award. The husband could retain his separate property or receive
his wife's joint interest, and upon his sale of the property he would
realize a gain of the purchase price over his basis. The husband
would then have time to plan for the gain he might realize upon the
sale and perhaps generate a loss to offset the gain to be realized
upon the sale of the property or at least assure a source of money to
pay the additional tax due as a result of the gain.

III. ALIMONY
The Internal Revenue Code requires the wife to include as
ordinary income those periodic payments she receives after a decree
of divorce or a decree of separate maintenance. 69 The periodic
payments must discharge a legal obligation imposed upon the
husband or incurred by him because of the marital or family
relationship pursuant to a court order, or decree of divorce, or a
written separation agreement. 70 If the husband's payment qualifies
under section 71(a) or (c) as a periodic payment which is
includable in the gross income of the wife, the husband is generally
entitled to deduct the amount paid from his gross income.71
The payments under section 71 apply only to payments made
because of the family or marital relationship and in recognition of
the general obligation of support which is made specific by a court
decree, instrument, or agreement. Thus, a lump sum payment or
payments which constitute the repayment of a bona fide loan
previously made by the wife, do not come within the purview of
72
section 71(a) or (c).

Because alimony payments are now deductible from the gross
income of the obligor, many individuals who do not itemize
deductions and file a 1040-A tax return can now deduct alimony
payments. This means that even in the low-income or middle-class
divorces, it may be wise from the tax planning standpoint to have
the husband pay alimony rather than additional child support.
69.
70.
71.
72.

I.R.C.
Treas.
1.R.C.
Treas.

§ 71 (a) & (c).
Reg. 1.71-1(b)(2) & (3). 25 Fed. Reg. 11402 (1960).
§ 215.
Reg. 1.71 -1(b)(4). 25 Fed. Reg. 11402 (1960).
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As has been previously discussed, a recurring )roblem in a
divorce is the disposition of the family home. Depending on
whether the home is held in joint tenancy, tenancy in common, or
sole ownership in either the husband or wife, the possible
dispositions of the home can result in different tax consequences. A
creative application of the requirement to pay alimony for a certain
period of time to assist in the payment of principal, interest, taxes,
and insurance can be used to meet the parties' desire to maintain
the home for the wife and children for that period of tirie. The time
period can run until the occurrence of a contingency such as the
sale of the home, the children attaining majority, the satisfaction of
the underlying mortgage, the death of either party, or the
remarriage of the wife.
Assume the parties own a home as joint tenants, and the home
is subject to a mortgage which obligates both parties. Rather than
sell the home immediately, the parties can continue to own it as
joint tenants and agree that the wife is to pay the mortgage from her
alimony. All of the alimony would be income to the wife, but
because she would pay all the interest on the mortgage, she would
have a corresponding deduction.7 3 The husband could agree to pay
74
part of or all of the taxes and deduct those payments.
If the divorce decree or the property separation agreement
provided that the wife was to receive support money without
specifically designating the nature of the support, for instance,
alimony or child support, and she was required to use thai support
money to pay all of the principal and interest payments on the
mortgage which was in both parties' names, one-half of the
payments made toward the principal and interest would be deemed
to be alimony income to the wife under section 71.71 This would
result in unexpected alimony income to the wife. As such, in the
event the parties own real property as tenants in common, and a
portion of the husband's support payments are allocated toward the
payment of principal, interest, taxes, and insurance on the
property, one-half will be deemed alimony provided the husband is
required to make the payments for more than ten years from the
date of decree, or if his obligation to make the payments is deemed
periodic.

76

Assume the home is owned solely by the husband, and he is
solely responsible for the payment of the principal and interest,
73. 1.R.C..§ 163.
74. I.R.C. § 164.
75. Rev. Rul. 67-420, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
76. Id.
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taxes, and insurance. If the wife is allowed to continue to live in the
home rent-free until the home is sold or otherwise disposed of, all
payments made by the husband are not deductible by him as
alimony. 7 7 He will still be allowed to deduct his interest payments
and taxes.
In the event the practitioner is handling the disposition of the
parties' home which is owned asjoint tenants, and the economics of
the divorce make it appear that the husband will have to continue
paying the principal and interest on the mortgage, the taxes, and
the insurance, the best tax plan may be the following:
1. Have the parties stipulate to the fair market value of the
property.
2. As to any equity in the property, reach an agreement on
how to divide this equity when the home is sold. Consider a fiftyfifty division, all to one or the other, or some other disproportionate
division remembering the implication of Davis and Revenue Ruling
74-347.
3. Prior to the final decree of divorce, convey the property to
the parties as tenants in common and sever the joint tenancy. Have
each party agree to be responsible for the payment of one-half of the
mortgage, taxes, and insurance.
4. In the divorce decree, require the husband to pay the wife
alimony equal to one-half of the principal and interest, taxes, and
insurance necessary to maintain the home. Have the husband
continue to pay his share of the principal, interest, taxes, and
insurance necessary to maintain his one-half interest in the home,
and further require that the wife pay one-half of the principal,
interest, taxes, and insurance to maintain her one-half interest in
the home.
5. Designate the husband's payments to the wife as alimony
which is subject to termination in the event of the happening of a
contingency such as his or her death, her remarriage, or the
inability of the husband to continue making the payments because
78
of a change in his economic circumstances.
Under this arrangement, the following tax consequences
should result:
1. All payments made by the husband to the wife should be
deductible as alimony.
2. The payments made by the husband toward his one-half of
the interest and taxes will be deductible because of his ownership of
79
one-half of the home.
77. James Park Bradley. 30 T.C. 701, 707 (1958).
78. Treas. Reg. 1.7 1-1(d)(3)(i) (a). 25 Fed. Reg. 1 1402 (1960).
79. I.R.C. § § 163-64.
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3. The wife will realize income of the alimony received but will
have a deduction because of her payment of one-half of the interest
80
and taxes.
Since neither party may deduct the insurance premium paid,
the husband might be required to pay additional alimony to cover
the wife's share of the insurance payments. This would result in
additional income to the wife and an increased deduction to the
husband. This would be advantageous if the husband was in a high
tax bracket and the wife was in a low tax bracket.
Payments received by the wife for support of the minor
children of the husband are not taxable as alimony. 81 If, however,
there is no designation of the nature of the support and maintenance
payments in the separation agreement or decree of divorce, all
payments made to the wife are deemed alimony.
In Commissioner v. Lester 2 the Supreme Court held that because
no designation was made in the divorce decree or separation
agreement concerning the nature of the payments made by the
husband to the wife (there was no breakdown as to what portion of
the payments was for child support and what portion of the
payments was for alimony), the entire payment was deemed to be
alimony. 8 3 Thus,

the failure to

designate

the nature

of the

payments to be received by the wife as alimony or child support,
will result in the entire payment being deemed alimony.
Frequently the parties have acquired many income-producing
assets during the course of the marriage. Rather than effect a
disposition or division of these assets, the parties can agree that the
husband should retain ownership because of his managerial
abilities. In return the husband can agree to pay his wife alimony,
child support, and a lump sum of money. Any payment which is a
true lump-sum payment will result in no alimony deduction for the
husband and no income tax consequences to the wife because the
84
payment will not be deemed a periodic support payment.
Where the husband agrees to pay a lump sum of money in
installments to discharge his wife's marital property rights, the
Internal Revenue Code provides that as the payments are made,
they will be deductible as alimony if they are made over a period of
more than ten years. 8 5 The yearly deduction allowed is ten percent
80. Id.
81.1.R.C. §71(b).
82. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
83. Id. at 306.
84. 1. R.C.. 7 1(.
85. 1. R. C.. 71(c) (2).
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of the total principal sum to be paid. 6 There may be no
prepayment of' future installments, but payment of delinquent
87
installments for prior taxable years may be paid in a lump sum,
and the payments are fully deductible to the husband and income to
the wife. This gives rise to an opportunity for some tax planning in
the event the soon-to-be-divorced parties are cooperative.
Assume the husband holds certain investments in real estate
which if' sold would result in a capital gain, but because of market
conditions it is not possible to sell or refinance the property at the
time of the divorce to generate cash to provide the wife with a lump
sum payment. Further assume that, as a result of the divorce, the
husband is obligated to pay his wife the sum of $100,000 over ten
years and one day at $10,000 a year. Further assume that after the
divorce the wife purchases from the husband an apartment building
which generates substantial paper losses for a minimal down
payment and the obligation to pay the sum of $100,000 at six
percent (6 %) interest in equal installments.
As each periodic alimony payment becomes due the husband
would write his wife a check for the amount due and she would
write him a check for installment payment due under the note. The
husband would deduct his alimony payment and the wife would
realize the alimony income. Some of the alimony income
recognized by the wife would be sheltered by the losses generated
by the excess depreciation from the rental property. The income
received by the husband upon the wife's payments could be
reported on the installment basis and taxed at favorable capital gain
rates.8 8 Of course the interest payments received would be ordinary
income to the husband.
Another planning opportunity requires the husband to become
intentionally delinquent on his alimony payments for several years.
The delitluency is in anticipation of the recognition of a capital gain
resulting from the sale of an investment which cannot be sold at the
time of the divorce. Upon the sale of the investment, the husband
would realize and recognize capital gains. Only forty percent of the
money realized would be included in his ordinary income. He
could then pay his wife the alimony arrearages from the gain
realized and deduct the entire delinquent alimony payment.
The payment of alimony rather than additional child support
may actually be beneficial to the husband. Assume that the parties
86. Id.
87. Treas. Reg. 1.71(d) (2), 25 'vd. Reg. 11402 (1960).
88. I.R,C, § § 1001. 453.
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have two children and it appears he would have to pay the sum of
$250 a month per child or $500 as child support. If the husband is
in the fifty percent tax bracket, it would be better for him to pay his
wife $3,000 a year as alimony and $1,500 a year for each child as
support. The wife should pay little or no income tax on the $3,000
received as alimony and, of course, would pay no tax on the child
support. Of course the wife would have to pay taxes on the alimony
she received if she had additional income from self-employment or
outside sources. The husband could deduct all of the alimony paid
and, assuming he claimed the children as dependents for tax
purposes receiving $1,000 exemption for each, he would have an
income tax savings of $2,500. Assuming this arrangement was
made, the husband still would have an actual cash expenditure of
$6,000, but because of the $2,500 income tax savings, he could use
$2,500 which ordinarily would have gone to pay taxes to apply
toward his $6,000 obligation.
In addition to the "ten-year installment rule," a principal sum
awarded under a divorce decree or separation agreement which is
to be paid in installments over a period ending tenyears or less from
the date of the decree or agreement will be deemed installment
payments in discharge of a principal sum if certain conditions are
met. These conditions are that the payments are subject to
termination upon the happening of one or more of the following
contingencies: the death of either spouse; the remarriage of the
wife; or a change in the economic status of either spouse; and, the
payments are in the nature of alimony or an allowance for support
which arises out of the marital obligation. 89 The contingencies of
the death of either party, the remarriage of the wife, or a change in
the economic status of either spouse may be recited in the divorce
decree, separation agreement, property settlement agreement, or
zmposed by local law. 90
Because of the "contingencies exceptions" to the ten-year rule
governing periodic payments, if the husband is required to pay
support periodically to his wife for a period which is less than ten
years, as when the husband is required to pay the sum of $100,000
in installments of $20,000 a year for five years, the payments made
will be deemed alimony. Of course the husband's obligation to
make these periodic payments must arise out of his support
obligation and must be subject to termination because of the death
of either party, the remarriage of the wife, or a change in the
89. Treas. Reg. 1.71-1(d)(3), 25 Fed. Reg. 11402 (1960).
90. Treas. Reg. 1.71-1(d)(3)(ii) (a), 25 Fed. Reg. 11402(1960).
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economic status of either party. Thus, if the husband is to pay a
lump sum of support over a period which is less than ten years,
good practice dictates that the settlement agreement or divorce
decree provide that the payments terminate upon the happening of
one of these contingencies. Further, the divorce decree or
settlement agreement should provide that the payments are made
as a part of the husband's support obligation to the wife arising out
of the marital relationship.
If the happening of a contingency such as death, remarriage,
or a change of economic circumstances will result in the
termination of the husband's support obligation to his former
spouse under state law, the periodic support payments of a
principal sum over a period of less than ten years will still be
deemed alimony. This is true even if the separation agreement or
divorce decree fails to specify the contingencies which would
terminate the husband's obligation to pay alimony. 9 1
Assume a North Dakota divorce in which the husband was
required to pay his wife support equal to the sum of $100,000 over a
period of five years in five equal payments, but the separation
agreement or decree of divorce failed to provide that the payments
were to cease in the event of death of either party, remarriage of the
wife, or a change in the economic status of the parties.
North Dakota law imposes these "contingencies" since it
provides that the husband's support obligation to his wife
terminates upon the death of either party, the remarriage of the
wife, or a change in the economic circumstances of either party. 92
In Haugeberg v. Haugeberg,93 the dissent commented on the general
law of North Dakota and noted that alimony (unless specifically
94
ordered) ends when either party dies or the wife remarries.
Further, statutory law provides that if the economic conditions of
the parties change, either party may seek a modification of alimony
and unless otherwise ordered, alimony ends upon death.9 5 If the
district court retains its jurisdiction to determine alimony at a
future date, or if it makes an initial award of alimony, the matter of
alimony is subject to modification should the economic status of
96
either party change.
If the wife will receive a lump sum to be paid in installments
91. Id.
92. See infra notes 93-95 and text referenced thereto.
93. 258 N.W.2d 657 (N.D. 1977).
94. Id. at 668. (Vogel, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Wiederanders v. Wiederanders, 187 N.W.2d 74
(N.D. 1971); Stoutland v. Stoutland, 103 N.W.2d 286 (N.D. 1960).
95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24(1971).

96. Id.
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over a period less than ten years, the payments must be in the
nature of alimony or support in addition to the possibility of
termination upon the happening of one of the "contingencies"
reflected in the separation agreement, divorce decree, or imposed
by local law. It is not sufficient to provide a lump sum of money
which is to be paid on an installment basis over a period less than
ten years even though the payment is subject to termination upon
the happening of a contingency. It must be specifically recognized
that the sum of money to be paid each month is designated for the
support of the wife, and that the payment is made because of the
husband's obligation to provide support to the wife. Of course, in
light of Becker, this leaves the husband open to a request for
additional alimony if the wife's economic circumstances change
materially.
The occasion may arise in which the practitioner representing
the wife wants to be absolutely sure that the payment she receives
will be non-periodic in order to avoid taxation to her upon receipt
of the payment. In order to insure that the payments she receives
will be deemed non-periodic and in discharge of the principal sum,
the payments should be paid over a period less than ten years.
Additionally, the payments should be contractual in nature with a
specific recital in the agreement or decree that the payments are in
lieu of the right to a property settlement and alimony, and that they
are not made because of the husband's obligation of support.
Furthermore, it would be wise to specify that the payments are an
obligation imposed upon the husband's estate, and if the wife dies
the payments must be made to her heirs or estate. Under North
Dakota law, if the payments to the wife arise under a contract and
not because of the husband's obligation of support, the amount of
the payments due under the contract cannot be modified. 97
If the practitioner is attempting to establish the contractual
nature of the payments, care must be taken in the draftsmanship of
the separation agreement or decree of divorce. Care must be used
because if either document provides that the payments are made as
part of the husband's support or alimony obligation, the payments
may be deemed alimony. Thus under state law the court would
have the power to modify or terminate the payment in light of a
change in the economic circumstances of the parties. 98
If the parties agree that the principal sum shall be paid over a
period of more than ten years, it is important to establish when the
97. Sinklerv. Sinkler, 49 N.D. 1144. 194 N.\V. 817 (192:3).
98. Kackv. Kack. 169 N.W.2d 111(N.D. 1969).
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installment payments commence and when they expire. 9 9 Care
must be taken to establish that the payments continue for at least
121 months. The date to begin computation of the ten year period
is that date of the divorce decree or the date of the written
separation agreement which gives rise to the obligation to make the
periodic payments over a period of more than ten years.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS ALIMONY QUESTIONS
A.

LIFE INSURANCE PREMIUMS

In many divorce cases the parties seek to insure a source of
payment of money due the spouse under the decree in the event of
the death of the husband. Many practitioners require that the
husband have an insurance policy, with the proceeds payable to the
wife to satisfy his obligations under the decree in the event of his
death. Often the husband wants to deduct the sum required to pay
the annual premiums to maintain the insurance. Generally, the
husband may only deduct the insurance premiums paid pursuant
to a divorce decree or separation agreement if he names the wile as
the irrevocable beneficiary and divests himself of all ownership and
control of the policy through an absolute assignment ofthe policy to
her.1 00 If such steps are taken he will have an alimony deduction
and she will have to include the premiums paid as income. If the
husband fails to assign ownership of the policy to his wife, yet pays
all of the premiums and has named her as the beneficiary, he will
not be afforded a deduction.
If the husband places a condition upon the assignment of the
policy to his wife; places a contingency upon her right to be the
beneficiary under the policy; reserves the right to later own the
policy; or reserves the right to designate beneficiaries in the event
she predeceases him; he may not claim the payment of premiums as
alimony, even though he has assigned the policy to her and has
named her as beneficiary.""0 Additionally, in light of' Davis, if the
policy transfer to the wife has a cash value, the husband will realize
a gain equal to the cash value of the policy less the amount of the
premiums paid during the length of the policy which went toward
99..Joslin Sr. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 231 (1969), aff'd., 424 F.2d 1223 (7(h Cir. 1970). In
/.]slin,
the husband was denied an alimony deduction even though the payments qualified as alitony
because the payments were not payable over a period of ten years. The obligation to make the
payments dated from the divorce decree ani not the earlier settlement agreement.
100. 1.R.C. Pub. No. 17.
101. Robert I. Montgonery, Jr.,
54, 1115
1'.C.M. (P-H); I. oisA. (-ole, 71, 0174 1'.C . M. (PH); William.i. Gardner v. Comm'r, 14 ' .C. 1445, (1950). qaf"d, 191 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1951).
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the purchase of the insurance protection. That portion of the gain
attributed to the accumulated interest will be taxed as ordinary
income. Therefore if the husband contemplates the transfer of the
ownership of a whole-life policy to his wife pursuant to the divorce,
all of the cash value of the policy should be withdrawn prior to the
assignment to avoid unexpected taxable gain.
B.

MEDICAL BILLS

Generally a husband's payment of the wife's medical and
dental expenses pursuant to a divorce decree or separation
agreement will be includable in the wife's gross income and
deductible by the husband as alimony if the following conditions
are met:
1. No principal sum is specified in the decree or agreement,
therefore he pays all incurred medical bills; or,
2. If a specific yearly amount is established and that amount is
to be paid over a period greater than ten years, or the payment of
the specific sum is subject to a contingency such as the death of
either party, the remarriage of the wife, or change in economic
10 2
status of either spouse.
If the decree or separation agreement provides that the
husband will pay his wife's dental or medical bills incurred prior to
the divorce, and following the divorce the husband pays those bills,
he is afforded no alimony deduction because the payment is
10 3
deemed a lump-sum payment rather than a periodic payment.
Additionally he will lose his normal medical and drug-expense
deductions since, because the parties are divorced, the payments
104
are not made for his dependent.
If there are substantial outstanding medical bills incurred by
the wife prior to the divorce which it appears that the husband is
going to be obligated to pay, it is recommended that the husband
pay the bills prior to the entry of the divorce decree. As long as the
payment is made while the parties are still married, the husband
will be allowed to deduct the medical expenses on his personal tax
10 5
return as a regular medical expense deduction.
C.

LEGAL FEES

102. Rev. Rul. 62-106. 1962-2 C.B. 21.
103. Aline S. Fisher. 56. 098 T.C.M. (P-H).
104.
§213.
105. Id.
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In United States v. Gilmore, 106 the Supreme Court rejected a
husband's claim that he was entitled to deduct a portion of his legal
expenses attributed to resisting his wife's claims for property and
alimony. The Court held that such expenses were better
characterized as personal or family expenses because the wife's
claims stem from the marital relationship and not from incomeproducing activity. 07
Following Gilmore, in United States v. Patrick,108 the Court held
that no deduction was available to the husband for legal fees
expended in connection with a settlement agreement negotiated to
protect his publishing company from his wife's claims arising
during the divorce. 0 9 In the event the court orders the husband to
pay the wife's attorney's fees, he cannot deduct the sums paid. " 0
Legal expenses incurred and paid for by the wife for services to
her in connection with the divorce or separation are deductible to
the extent that they are attributed to the production or collection of
amounts includable in gross income as alimony payments."' Since
the wife is allowed this deduction, it is recommended that the
husband pay additional alimony for a period to equal the amount of
legal fees he normally would have to pay on her behalf and then
provide that the wife pay her own legal fees. The wife would
recognize some additional alimony income but should get a
corresponding deduction for the legal fees she paid.
It is important that the attorney for the wife segregate his
charges into three areas: fees attributed to the securing of taxable
alimony; fees attributed to the securing of non-taxable property
settlement; and fees attributed to securing child support. If there is
a failure by the wife's attorney to designate fees, the Service has the
power to determine what portion of her legal fees are attributed to
the securing of alimony, a non-taxable property settlement, and
2
child support. "
The preparation of the statement for attorney's fees sent to the
husband should also specify what portion of the incurred fees relate
to the various services performed in conjunction with the divorce.
If the statement prepared by the husband's attorney segregates on a
time allocated basis the time required for the resolution of tax
106. 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
107. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 51-52 (1963).
108. 372 U.S. 53 (1963).
109. United States v. P'atrick. 372 U.S. 53. 77 (1963).
110. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65. 74-75 (1962). See alsoArthur B. Baer v.
Commiissioner. l6T.C. 1418 (1951) qff'don issue ofnon-deductibility of/e.alfes, 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir.
1952).
111. Jane U. Elliott v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 304 (1963). SeualsoHazel Porier,
66. 079
T.C.M. (P-H). aff'd, 388 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1968).
112. Marelle H. Howard. 75. 170 T.C.M. (P-H).
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problems arising in the divorce, the difficulty of the tax questions
presented, the amount of taxes involved, the fees attributed to a
resolution of the tax problem, and further sets forth the fees
charged for the non-tax aspects of the divorce, the portion of the
fees incurred for the tax advice will be deductible.' 13 Thus, it is very
important that both attorneys in a divorce action keep accurate
records of the portion of their time and fees which relate to the tax
implications of the divorce.
D.

AI.IMONY TRUSTS

Generally speaking, if a trust is created with the purpose of
making payments to a divorced or separated wife,, all payments
made from it, whether from trust corpus or income, are includable
in her income as ordinary income. 114
If the husband transfers appreciated property to the alimony
trust with a corresponding release of the wife's right to receive
future alimony and in settlement of her property rights, Davis will
apply and the husband will realize a gain upon the transfer of the
appreciated property.
Since the husband is not taxed on the income from the trust
paid to the wife, he has no deduction for alimony payments because
115
the trust is making the actual payments and he is not.
If part of the payments from the trust to the wife are made as
child support, that portion of the payments made as child support
will not be taxable to the wife but will be taxable to the husband
because of his obligation to support his children. 116
If prior to a divorce or written separation agreement the
husband had created a trust for the benefit of his wife and pursuant
to the written separation agreement or decree of divorce she is
given the trust in.full satisfaction of his obligation of support and his
obligation to provide alimony, the trust will be deemed an alimony
trust and all payments received by the wife will be ordinary
income'1 7 whether the source of the payments is from trust income
or corpus. If the wife receives alimony and a property settlement in
addition to the previously created trust, the distributions from the
trust will be treated as ordinary income (or capital gain income
113.

R ut. 72-545. 1972-2 C. B. 179.
114. I.R.C. § 7 I(a)& 'rcas. Rcg. 1.682(a)-(l)(a)(2). 25 Fed. Reg. 11814 (1960).
8
115. 1.R.C. § 6 2(a).
6

116. .R.C. § § 71 (1), 682 (a). Treas. Reg. 1. 82-(a) (I).
I 17. Sre supra houtc 76.

25 Fvd. Reg. 11814 (1960).
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depending upon its source) and distribution from the trust corpus
1 18
will not be taxed.

V. CHILD SUPPORT
All payments made under the decree of divorce or separation
which are to be made as child support should be specifically
designated. A failure to designate which portion of the support
payments made to the wife is child support and which is alimony
will result in her having to include all of the support money
9
received as alimony. 1
In divorce decrees or written separation agreements involving
children, it should be stipulated which parent is entitled to claim
the children as dependents for tax purposes because each
dependent will result in a $1,000 exemption to the parent claiming
the exemption 120 for federal income tax purposes and a $750
exemption for North Dakota income tax purposes.' 2 1 Problems
arise when the divorce decree or. separation agreement fails to
provide which parent may claim the child or children as dependents
for income tax purposes. The parent having any child in his or her
custody for one-half or more of the year is entitled to claim the child
as a dependent for exemption purposes.' 22 The non-custodial
parent will be entitled to claim the child as a dependent if he
provides $600 a year toward the child's support and the decree of
divorce or separation agreement provides that he shall be entitled to
claim the child as a dependent. Additionally, if the non-custodial
parent contributes $1,200 a year toward the support of the child, or
toward the support of all the children in the care and control of the
custodial parent, the non-custodial parent has the right to claim the
child or all of the children as dependents. If, however, the custodial
parent establishes by a clear preponderance of the evidence that he
has provided for more support for the child or children than the
non-custodial parent, the custodial parent has the right to claim the
child or all of the children as dependents. 23 In the event the divorce
decree or separation agreement fails to provide who shall have the
right to claim the child or children as dependents, the parent
118. See supra note 76.
119. See supra notes 81 & 82 and accompanying text.

120. I.R.C, § 151 presently allows a S 1,000 exemption for each dependent ofthe taxpayer.
121. N.D. CENT. COoE § 57-38-01.2 (Supp. 1979).
122. .R. C. 152.§ (6).
123. Treas. Reg. § 1. 152-4(d) (2), 36 Fed. Reg. 5337 (1971.
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intending to claim the child or children as a dependent may request
an itemized statement of expenditures which the other parent feels
he has contributed by way of support. Along with this request the
parent must notify the other of his intention to claim the child as an
exemption and include with this notice an itemized statement of the
support he feels he has furnished for the child or children during the
year. 124
The parties can stipulate in writing after the divorce decree
who may claim the children as exemptions. This agreement can be
made after the close of the taxable year in which the exemptions
were claimed as long as the statute of limitations has not run on the
taxable year of the party claiming the exemption. 2 5 A copy of this
agreement should be attached to the taxpayer's return if he is the
126
non-custodial parent claiming the exemption.
In addition to the monthly payments required to be paid as
child support, the non-custodial parent who pays for hospital or
dental insurance premiums; medical, dental, or hospital expenses;
education, recreation, or transportation expenses; or provides
additional food, shelter or clothing for the children will be given
127
credit toward the $600 or $1,200 support requirement.
In the event the non-custodial parent is required to pay at least
$600 per child and is granted the right to claim the children as
dependents for tax purposes in the divorce decree, the custodial
parent who pays medical expenses or contributes toward medical
insurance on behalf of the children will be denied the right to
28
deduct those expenses as medical expense deductions. 1
Furthermore, if the non-custodial parent is granted the right to
claim the children as dependents for tax purposes and is further
obligated to contribute the sum of $600 a year per child as support,
the non-custodial parent may deduct-the amounts paid for medical
and dental expenses, drug expense, and insurance premiums for
medical, dental and hospital insurance paid on behalf of the
29

children. 1
In today's society a major expense for working parents is day

care or babysitting expenses incurred for the care of pre-school
children. These expenses are usually incurred so the custodial
parent can remain gainfully employed. Presently a divorced or
separated parent is eligible for a tax credit for the care of a child
124.
125.
126.
127.
199.

Treas. Reg. k 1.152-4(e), 36 Fed. Reg. 5337 (1971).
Rev. Rul. 70-73, 1970-1 C.B. 29.
Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(d)(2), 36 Fed. Reg. 5337 (1971).
Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(e)(3)(vi). 36 Fed. Reg. 5337 (1971).
lennie S. Meshulam, q 76, 111 T.C.M. (P-H).
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who is under fifteen years old or who is incapable of self care even if
the parent is not entitled to a dependency exemption for the child under
section 152.130 The parent is entitled to the credit so long as he or
she has custody of the child for a longer period during the year than
the other parent. The credit is equal to twenty percent of the
parent's employment-related child-care expenses up to $2,000 for
one child and $4,000 for two or more children. This results in a
maximum tax credit of $400 for one child and $800 for two or more
children.
VI. ESTATE AND GIFT TAX CONSEQUENCES
A.

GIFT TAX

When a husband and wife have provided in writing for certain
transfers or releases of marital and other property rights, and the
transfers are either in settlement of the marital or other property
rights, or are made to provide for reasonable support for the
children of the marriage, the transfers will be deemed to have been
made for full and adequate consideration, and no taxable gift will
result if a divorce is obtained within two years after the written
agreement.' 3 ' A failure to obtain the divorce decree within two
years of the written agreement may result in the transfers being
deemed gifts even though a divorce is obtained after the expiration
of the two-year period. Accordingly, it is wise to avoid transfers
under a written agreement if the divorce litigation may take longer
than two years.
B.

ESTATE TAX

If, pursuant to a divorce decree, the husband is obligated to
pay child support and alimony to his wife until her remarriage or
her, not his, death and he dies before the remarriage or death of his
wife and before the child support obligation has terminated, his
estate will be allowed a deduction for the commuted value of the
payments due the wife for future alimony and future child
support. 3 2 The husband's estate is afforded this deduction because
of the obligation imposed upon him by the divorce decree to pay
1. R. C. § 44A (f) (5).
131. I.R.C. 5 2516.
132. I.R.C. § 2053 (a) (1), (3) (4). See Estate of Donald Elbert Lester, Sr., 57 T.C. 503 (1972).

130.
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alimony and child support. 133 The actual deduction allowed the
husband's estate is computed through the use of actuarial and
remarriage tables in light of the former wife's age at the time of her
former husband's death, and the nature and duration of the
obligation to provide alimony and child support imposed under the
34

divorce decree. 1

In the event the alimony is subject to termination upon the
wife's death or remarriage and she either remarries or dies before
the former husband's final estate tax return is filed, his estate will
only be allowed to deduct the actual alimony payments made
during the administration of his estate and not the commuted value
of the alimony payments imposed upon the estate at the time of his
death. 135
In the event the divorce decree obligates the husband to
maintain life insurance on his life payable to his wife, the proceeds
paid to her upon his death will be includable in and deductible from
his estate because of the obligation imposed upon him to provide
136
life insurance coverage payable to his wife.
An estate deduction will not be allowed based upon an
obligation imposed on the husband's estate because his ex-wife or
present wife had relinquished or promised to relinquish her right to
a statutorily created estate or to her marital rights in the decedent's
property or estate. 13 7 If, however, the obligation imposed upon the
estate is imposed because the former wife gave up her right to a
support obligation imposed upon the husband by virtue of a written
agreement or state law, the estate will be afforded.a deduction to
the extent of the obligation.

138

If the husband creates and funds a trust for the support of his
minor children and reserves the power to amend or revoke the trust
either by himself or in conjunction with his ex-wife, the value of the
trust will be includable in his estate only to the extent its value
39
exceeds the prospective value of the children's support rights. 1
If a deduction for the estate is sought because of the obligation
imposed upon the decedent pursuant to a written agreement to
waive the right to support, or because of the obligation to pay
alimony and child support imposed upon the decedent with a
133. Estate of Donald Elbert Lester, Sr., 57 T.C. 503 (1972).
134. Rev. Rul. 71-67, 1971-1 C.B. 271.
135. Estate ofChesterton v. United States, 551 F.2d 278 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
136. Estate ofWilliam E. Robertson, 63 T.C. 717 (1975).
137. 1.R.C. § 2043(b).
138. Sherman v. United States, 462 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1972); In Re Estate of Davis, 440 F.2d
896 (3rd Cir. 1971).
139. Chase National Bank v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1955), aff'd 19 T.C. 672;
Estate of Robert M. McKeon, 25 T.C. 697 (1956).
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decree of divorce, or because of the creation of a trust for the
support of his children over which the decedent retains certain
powers of control, the claim should be timely filed with the probate
4 0
court or the personal representative to keep the deduction. 1
VII. CONCLUSION
As can be seen from the foregoing, even the most amicable
divorce involves income tax ramifications to both parties which
must be addressed and made known to the parties.
Too often the parties and their attorneys turn a divorce into an
opportunity for gladitorial combat and lose sight of income tax
considerations regarding the division of property, the obligation to
pay alimony, and the obligation to pay child support.
Considering the potential adverse tax consequences inherent in
all divorces, counsel for both parties must strive to work together to
achieve the best overall settlement of the dissolution of the marriage
with true regard for the income tax consequences to both parties.
This requires a consideration of the parties' earning ability, present
and future income tax brackets, and ability to pay the income taxes
which might arise as a result of the proposed property division,
alimony payments, and child support.
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